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What Computers Still Can’t Do: 
five reviews and a response 
Mark Stefik and Stephen Smoliar, editors 
What Computers Still Can’t Do is the latest in a series of books by Herbert 
Dreyfus i:n which he challenges the foundations and methods of artificial 
intelligencle. Within the field of artificial intelligence, Dreyfus’ work has been 
controversial and has led to responses both in this column and elsewhere [l, 21. 
Some people cite his work as influential, arguing that at various times AI has been 
complacent in its methods and that issues raised by Dreyfus have later become 
areas of investigation in the field. Others say that the technical and scientific basis 
for Dreyfus’ arguments is too shallow. Practitioners in AI and cognitive psy- 
chology use multiple models and understand their limitations. Critics say that 
Dreyfus speaks to a strawman, inadequately presenting the state of the art and 
the practitioner’s deeper understanding of models used in AI and cognitive 
psychology. 
The relationships between scientists and philosophers and scientists and 
historians are sometimes tinged with suspicion. We begin with historians. 
Scientists often view anyone outside of their field as simply not knowing enough 
to have anything significant to say. They do not like watered down accounts of 
scientific history or the conclusions drawn from them. For example, in his book 
Genius: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman, James Gleick observed that 
Feynman resented the polished myths of most scientific history, which submerge 
the false steps and halting uncertainties under a surface of orderly intellectual 
progress. Historians, on the other hand, have professional concerns that scientists 
interpret the past too much from the vantage point of the present. Scientists 
reporting on their own field often have an ego investment, and their reports may 
overemphasize the significance of their own roles. Suspicion is even greater when 
an author offers an extended critique of current and recent history. 
Philosophers also have a difficult relationship to science, although the line is 
difficult to draw. One view is that philosophers are generalists and that they see 
scientists as missing the big picture. Philosophers see themselves as providing 
independent criticisms and suggestions for guiding science. Reacting to this, 
empirical scientists may criticize philosophers as spending too much time in their 
armchairs and not enough time in libraries and laboratories. But this characteriza- 
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tion is too simple. Just as there are many schools of thought in AI there are many 
schools of thought among philosophers. Today we have philosophers like John 
Pollock and Dan Dennett, who are not content to sit in their armchairs. They are 
willing to take on some of the most challenging literature and to provide valuable 
perspectives. Perhaps a safer way to over-simplify would be to say 
that philosophers argue about questions while scientists seek answers. Some- 
times, scientists may get stuck on finding their answers because they have not seen 
the possibilities for varying the questions. Philosophers revel in those 
possibilities; and, when their revels are well enough informed, scientists can 
benefit. 
In this set of reviews, we have sought to bring these perspectives to the fore, 
selecting a mix of reviewers that includes philosophers, historians, and practicing 
scientists in artificial intelligence. After the review, Dreyfus presents a response to 
them. 
Harry Collins is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Science Studies 
Centre at the University of Bath. He is currently working on a new theory of 
action and applying it to the understanding of the transmission of knowledge and 
skills between humans and machines. His books include ArtiJcial Experts: Social 
Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, and, with T. Pinch, The Golem: What 
Everyone Should Know about Science. 
John Haugeland is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. His 
principal interests are early Heidegger, the philosophy of mind, philosophical 
issues in artificial intelligence and psychology, and metaphysics. He is the editor 
of Mind Design (1981) and the author of Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea 
(1985). A volume of his papers will be published by Harvard University Press 
later this year; and he is working on a book on Heidegger. 
Timothy Koschmann is an Associate Professor in the Department of Medical 
Education at Southern Illinois University. His current interests are in the area of 
Computer Support for Collaborative Learning (CSCL). He is in the process of 
editing a book entitled CSCL: Theory and Practice of an Emerging Paradigm 
which will be published this year by Lawrence Erlbaum. 
John McCarthy is a Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University. His 
research has been mainly in the area of artificial intelligence. Recent books 
include Formalizing Common Sense (1990). 
Lindley Darden is Professor of Philosophy, a Member of the Committee on the 
History and Philosophy of Science, and the Committee on Cognitive Studies, at 
the University of Maryland, College Park. Her research is in the areas of scientific 
discovery, the history of Mendelian and molecular genetics, and computational 
philosophy of science. She published Theory Change in Science: Strategies from 
Mendelian Genetics in 1991 and “Protein sequencing experiment planning using 
analogy” (with Brian Kettler), in the Proceedings of the First International 
Conference on Intelligent Systems for Molecular Biology in 1993. 
John Strom is a doctoral candidate in the philosophy department of the 
University of Maryland, College Park. 
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